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LABOR LAW -

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND SEVENTH CIRCUITS

SPLIT OVER WHETHER UNION DISCIPLINE OF SUPERVISOR-MEMBERS

FOR CROSSING PICKET LINES TO PERFORM RANK-AND-FILE STRUCK
WORK IS AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE.

IBEW v. NLRB (D.C. Cir. 1973)
NLRB v. Local 2150, IBEW (7th Cir. 1973)
Although under section 8 (b) (1) (B) of the National Labor Relations
Act (the Act) a union may not compel an employer to retain a union
member as a foreman or supervisor,' many supervisory personnel in fact
do retain their union membership upon promotion. During an economic
strike, the supervisor who is also a member of a union (supervisor-member)
must choose between conflicting loyalties. He may side with management
and help keep the enterprise in operation, or he may refuse to cross the
picket line. If he crosses the picket line and performs rank-and-file struck
work the union may find him deserving of discipline.
In three recent cases (Electrical Workers), IBEW, Local 2150
(Wisconsin Electric Power Co.), 2 IBEW, Local 134 (Illinois Bell Tele4
phone Co.), 8 IBEW System Council U-4 (Florida Power and Light Co.),
the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) found that locals of the
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers committed unfair labor
practices by disciplining supervisor-members who crossed picket lines and
performed rank-and-file work during a lawful economic strike. One case 5
was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
which enforced the Board's order holding that such discipline, in the form
of fines and suspension, restrained or coerced an employer in the selection
of his representatives for the purpose of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances, and as such was an unfair labor practice in violation of
section 8(b) (1) (B).6 NLRB v. Local 2150, IBEW, 486 F.2d 602 (7th
1. See International Typographical Union, Local 38 v. NLRB, 278 F.2d 6 (1st
Cir. 1960), aff'd in part and revd in part, 365 U.S. 705 (1961).
2. 192 N.L.R.B. 77 (1971).
3. 192 N.L.R.B. 85 (1971).
4. 193 N.L.R.B. 30 (1971).
5. Wisconsin Electric Power Company, the facts of which were as follows:
The company and the union enjoyed a collective bargaining relationship since the
1930's. During an economic strike in 1969 virtually all the company's supervisormembers reported for work. There was no suggestion in the record that the company
had given the supervisors an option of whether or not to cross the picket line.
Following the strike the union preferred charges against 60 supervisors and after a
trial found all guilty, imposing on each a $100 fine and a year's suspension - the
sentence to be suspended if no similar offense was committed within two years.
None of the supervisors involved was a member of the bargaining unit, but
the collective bargaining agreement provided that, upon his promotion to a supervisory
position, an employee would be entitled to participate in pension and insurance plans
as a holder of a union "withdrawal card." All other benefits of membership, including
the right to attend union meetings, were denied.
6. Section 8(b) (1) (B) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents . . . to
restrain or coerce . . . an employer in the selection of his representatives for the

purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances.
29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (B) (1970).
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Cir. 1973), petition for cert. filed 42 U.S.L.W. 3375 (U.S. Dec. 25, 1973)
(No. 73-887). Two cases 7 were heard by the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit which, in an en banc decision,
denied enforcement and remanded the cases to the Board with instructions
to dismiss the complaints holding that the unions did not commit unfair
labor practices under section 8(b) (1) (B), IBEW v. NLRB, 487 F.2d
1143 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3422 (U.S. Jan. 22,
1974) (No. 73-795).
Early Board decisions were equivocal as to the status of supervisors
and the protections afforded them under the Act as enacted in 1935.8 In
Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB 9 the Supreme Court decided the major
issue by holding that foremen were literally within the statutory term
"employee" and thus covered by the Act.' 0 Congress, however, believed
statutorily mandated unionization of supervisors was inconsistent with the
purposes of the Act, which were, inter alia, to assure workers freedom
7. Florida Power and Light Co. and Illinois Bell Telephone Co. were the two
cases heard by the District of Columbia Circuit. The facts of Florida Power and Light
Company were as follows:
Since 1953 the company had maintained a collective bargaining agreement
with the IBEW, under which union membership was voluntary for all employees.
Although the company was not so required (see notes 13-17 and accompanying text
infra), it recognized the union as the exclusive bargaining representative for many
of its supervisory employees. The case involved high ranking supervisors who,
though union members, were not represented by the union for collective bargaining purposes.
In 1969 the union engaged in a lawful economic strike, and many supervisors
crossed the picket line and performed rank-and-file struck work. Because of a clause
in the collective bargaining agreement, the union did not fine those supervisors who
crossed the line solely to perform their usual supervisory functions, but it did fine
those who performed struck work, and expelled most from the union. Those expelled
lost their right to continue in pension, disability, and Death Benefit Funds.
There was no record as to whether the supervisors crossed the picket line
voluntarily or at the request of the company.
The facts of the Illinois Bell Telephone Co. case differed as follows:
Certain supervisors including foremen were required to be union members
under a union security clause, while others, high ranking supervisors, could maintain
union membership although they were not part of the bargaining unit. All supervisormembers received substantial union benefits.
During an economic strike in 1968, the company imposed no penalty upon
supervisor-members who refused to work, but the union warned them that they would
be subject to discipline if they performed rank-and-file work. During the strike some
of the supervisor-members crossed picket lines and performed struck work. They
were fined $500 by the union, but were not expelled or denied benefits.
8. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended 29 U.S.C. 141-87 (1970). The Board first
held that supervisors were "employees" entitled to the protections of the Act. Union
Collieries Coal Co., 41 N.L.R.B. 961 (1942). One year later the Board reasoned that
the failure of Congress to expressly include or exclude supervisors in the statutory
definition of the term "employee," indicated that the determination was to be left to
the administrative discretion of the Board, and the Board proceeded to deny organizational rights to supervisors. Maryland Dry Dock Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 733 (1943).
Subsequently, the Board again changed its position and permitted supervisors mandatory collective bargaining under the Act. See Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 66
N.L.R.B. 386 (1946); Packard Motor Car Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 4 (1945), enforced, 157
F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1946), affirmed 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
9. 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
10. The decision in Packard, although statutorily correct, was deemed to be poor
policy by Congress. See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1947), quoted in
NLRB, I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT 305
(1948) [hereinafter cited as LEGlS. HIST.].
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from domination in their organizing and bargaining activities and to protect the employer's right to loyal management, 1' and, in response, amended
the Act in 1947 by including in the Labor-Management Relations Act
(Taft-Hartley Act) 1 2 sections 14(a), 13 2(11), 14 and 2(3), 15 which excluded supervisors from the protections of the Act by excluding them from
the statutory definition of "employee."'16' Supervisors were permitted to
organize, although an employer could lawfully refuse to consider supervisors as employees for the purposes of any law relating to collective
7
bargaining.'
The Taft-Hartley Act also created union unfair labor practices,l"
including section 8(b) (1) (B) which made it an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization or its agents "to restrain or coerce .

.

. an employer in

the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining
or the adjustment of grievances."' 9 The subsection was provided so that
a union could not legally coerce an employer into joining or resigning from
an employer association which negotiates labor contracts, and could not
dictate who would represent the employer in the collective bargaining
process.20 Until 1968, typical application of section 8(b)(1)(B) had
found union unfair labor practices in situations in which a union bad
attempted to force an employer to hire only union foremen, 21 to fire a
11. Id.

12. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1970).
13. Section 14(a) provides:
Nothing herein shall prohibit any individual employed as a supervisor from
becoming or remaining a member of a labor organization, but no employer subject
to this subchapter shall be compelled to deem individuals defined herein as supervisors or employees, for the purpose of any law, either national or local, relating
to collective bargaining.
29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1970).
14. Section 2(11) provides:
The term "supervisor" means any individual having authority, in the interest
of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge,
assign, reward or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them,
or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely
routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1970).
15. Section 2(3) provides in pertinent part that "[t]he term 'employee' . . . shall

not include . . . any individual employed as a supervisor .... " Id. § 152(3).
16. Early judicial interpretation of the Act supports this view:
Before the adoption of this amendatory legislation, it was of course true, as the
Supreme Court said in its Packard opinion, that there was nothing in the National
Labor Relations Act which indicated that Congress intended to deny its benefits
to foremen as employees. It is now unmistakably clear, however, that the 80th
Congress intended to deny, and has denied, the benefits of the Act to "supervisors."
L.A. Young Spring & Wire Corp. v. NLRB, 163 F.2d 905, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1947),
citing S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1947).
17. National Labor Relations Act [hereinafter cited as the NLRA] § 14(a), 29
U.S.C. § 164(a) (1970).
18. NLRA § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (B) (1970).
20. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1947), quoted in I LEGIs. HiST.
at 427.
21. International Typographical Union, Local 38 v. NLRB, 278 F.2d 6 (1st Cir.
1960), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 365 U.S. 705 (1961).
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to bargain
supervisor because of his dispute with a union, 22 or had refused
23
employer.
an
of
representative
chosen
properly
with a
In 1968, the Board expanded the application of section 8(b) (1) (B)
to include situations in which a union had disciplined supervisor-members.
In San Francisco-OaklandMailers' Union No. 18,24 the Board was confronted with the action of a union which had cited and subsequently
fined a supervisor-member for failing to appear before a union executive
committee investigating the supervisor's alleged violations of the collective
bargaining agreement in assigning work. The Board held the union's
conduct to be an unfair labor practice because of the implied threat of
disciplinary action if the committee disagreed with the foreman's interpretation of the agreement. Although there was no allegation that the union
was attempting to coerce the employer into hiring a new representative,
the Board found the activity to be within the proscriptions of section
8(b) (1)(B) since discipline of the supervisor-member could change the
employer's representative from one representing management's viewpoint,
25
to one responsive or subservient to the union's will.
Since Oakland Mailers,the Board and the courts have used its rationale
when finding unfair labor practices in a variety of situations in which a
supervisor-member had been disciplined for the manner in which he per-

27
26
In Meat Cutters,Local 81 v. NLRB,
formed his management functions.

the District of Columbia Circuit gave its approval to this line of cases.

28

In Meat Cutters a union had fined and expelled an employer's meat
department manager because the union thought that the manner in which
he had carried out his employer's directives regarding meat procurement
22. Local 207, Iron Workers v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701 (1963).
23. NLRB v. Local 294, Teamsters, 284 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1960); NLRB v.
ILGWU, 274 F.2d 376 (3d Cir. 1960).
24. 172 N.L.R.B. 2173 (1968).
25. Id. The Board reasoned:
That [the union] may have sought the substitution of attitudes rather than persons, and may have exerted its pressures upon the Charging Party by indirect
rather than direct means, cannot alter the ultimate fact that pressure was exerted
here for the purpose of interfering with the Charging Party's control over its
representatives. Realistically the Employer would have to replace its foremen or
face de facto non-representation by them.
Id.
26. See, e.g., NLRB v. New Mexico Dist. Council of Carpenters, 454 F.2d 1116
(10th Cir. 1972) (supervisor fined for working for employer who was not making
payments into the union health and welfare fund); Dallas Mailers, Local 143 v.
NLRB, 445 F.2d 730 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (supervisor-member disciplined for manner
in which he directed employee) ; NLRB v. Toledo Locals 15-P & 272, Lithographers
& Photo-Engravers, 437 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1971) (union did not follow grievance
settlement procedures in disciplining supervisor-members who, the union claimed,'
violated the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement by continuing to work
during a strike in a work crew smaller than the agreement provided); NLRB v.
Sheet Metal Workers, Local 49, 430 F.2d 1348 (10th Cir. 1970) (supervisor-member
disciplined for performing work prior to the beginning of the regular workday and
for jurisdictional violations). But see, Local 453, Bhd. of Painters (Syd Gough &
Sons, Inc.), 183 N.L.R.B. No. 24, 74 L.R.R.M. 1539 (1970) (no section 8(b) (1) (B)
violation where union fined supervisor-member for failing to register with the union
as required by union rules before returning to his job after a strike settlement).
27. 458 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
28. Id. at 798.
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had violated the collective bargaining agreement. 29 The court found that
section 8(b)(1)(B) proscribed indirect, as well as direct, interference
with management's choice of representatives30 and that the union had
violated the Act when it fined and expelled the supervisor in retaliation
for his performance of management duties.3 ' The court further stated
that a supervisor's union obligations cannot detract from the absolute
loyalty owed to his employer when performing a management function.32
However, the court was careful to note that it was not adopting a per se
approach, and that a union could legally discipline a supervisor-member
for acts not performed in furtherance of the individual's obligations as the
33
employer's representative.
Concurrent with the formulation of the Oakland Mailers doctrine was
the development of the law regarding union discipline of members within
the statutory term "employee." 3 4 NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing
Co.35 concerned union members who had crossed a picket line during a
lawful economic strike and had been found guilty of "conduct unbecoming
a union member" by the union and fined from $20 to $100. The members
did not pay the fines and the union sought court enforcement. Allis-Chalmers
filed unfair labor practice charges against the union alleging violation of
section 8(b) (1) (A). 3 6 The Supreme Court held that reasonable fines
and their subsequent court enforcement were an allowable sanction and
not a restraint or coercion violative of section 8(b) (1) (A) .3 The Court
found that the power to fine or expel strikebreakers was essential to a
union if it was to be an effective bargaining agent,38 and that Congress did
not intend to regulate union self-government through section 8(b) (1)
(A).3 9 While drawing "cogent support" from the proviso to section
8(b) (1) (A), 40 the Court, significantly for analysis of section 8(b) (1) (B)
problems, did not rely on it. 41 Rather the Court found union discipline
29. Id. at 797.
30. Id. at 798, citing San Francisco-Oakland Mailers Union No. 18, 172 N.L.R.B.
2173 (1968).
31. 458 F.2d at 798-99.
32. Id. at 800.
33. Id. at 798 n.12. See also Local 453, Bhd. of Painters (Syd Gough & Sons,
Inc.), 183 N.L.R.B. No. 24, 74 L.R.R.M. 1539 (1970).
34. See notes 15 & 16 and accompanying text supra.
35. 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
36. NLRA §8(b) (1) (A) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization . . . to restrain or
coerce . . . employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of
this title: Provided, that this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor
organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention
of membership therein. ...
29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1970).
37. 388 U.S. at 195. See NLRB v. Boeing Co., 93 S. Ct. 1952 (1973), concerning
the reasonableness of union fines.
38. 388 U.S. at 181, citing Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline,
64 HARv. L. REv. 1049 (1951).
39. 388 U.S. at 195. In the Court's view, the federal policy of promoting labor
organization mandated that a union be permitted to protect against erosion of its
status through reasonable discipline of members, especially during a strike. Id. at 181.
40. Id. at 191.
41. byId.
at 192 n.29.
See note
36 supra.
Published
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for violation of internal union rules not to be the type of "restraint or
coercion" proscribed by the Taft-Hartley amendments. 42 The restraint
or coercion language is common to sections 8(b) (1) (A) and (B).
In NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers43
the Court further defined its position on union discipline, holding that the
Board was warranted in finding that a union's action in fining a member
for filing a charge against the union with the Board, without first exhausting all intra-union remedies, constituted an unfair labor practice under
section 8(b) (1) (A). 4 The Court stated that section 8(b) (1) (A) assures
a union freedom of self-regulation as far as its legitimate internal affairs
are concerned, but that the policy of preserving a member's freedom to
complain to the Board would override even legitimate union interests. 45
In Scofield v. NLRB 46 the Court synthesized its position on union
discipline of employee-members, and held:
[S] ection 8(b) (1) leaves a union free to enforce a properly adopted
rule which reflects a legitimate union interest, impairs no policy Congress has imbedded in the labor laws, and is reasonably enforced
against union
members who are free to leave the union and escape
47
the rule.
The Court recognized that enforcement of any union rule affects the interests of all three participants in the labor-management relation - employer, employee, and union48 - but made it clear that impact beyond the
labor organization does not make a rule violative of section 8(b) (1) (A)
49
unless it impairs some statutory labor policy.
Thus the lines of cases represented by Oakland Mailers and AllisChalmers meet in the instant cases, the issue being whether the Oakland
Mailers proscription of discipline of supervisor-members should be extended to strikebreaking, clearly an area of legitimate union interest under
Allis-Chalmers. In close decisions, the District of Columbia Circuit, en
banc, and a Seventh Circuit panel took widely divergent views with respect
to the applicability of section 8 (b) (1) (B) to union discipline of supervisormembers who cross picket lines to perform rank-and-file struck work.
The Seventh Circuit rejected the four principal arguments raised by
the union and found the same discipline to be an unfair labor practice. 50
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

388 U.S. at 195.
391 U.S. 418 (1968).
Id. at 428.
Id. at 424.
394 U.S. 423 (1969).

47. Id. at 430. The Board may find that a union commits an unfair labor practice

in seeking court enforcement of fines imposed for strike breaking activities by employees who have resigned from the union. NLRB v. Granite State Joint Bd., Textile

Workers, 409 U.S. 213 (1972). See also Booster Lodge No. 405, Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists v. NLRB, 93 S. Ct. 1961 (1973).
48. 394 U.S. at 431. Cf. NLRB v. Boeing Co., 93 S. Ct. 1952 (1973).

49. 394 U.S. at 432. The Court then held that a union rule against violating
piecework ceilings could be enforced by reasonable fines. Id. at 436.
50. NLRB v. Local 2150, IBEW, 486 F.2d 602, 610 (7th Cir. 1973). For the
facts of the case, see note 6 supra.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss3/6
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First, the court refused to construe section 8(b)(1)(B) as prohibiting
only direct coercion of the employer. The court adopted the Oakland
Mailers rationale that section 8(b) (1) (B) proscribes coercion in the form
of indirect as well as direct pressure. The court stated:
[The] employer's right to select those representatives whom he chooses
would be worthless if the Union could accomplish the functional
equivalent of restraining or coercing him in that selection by applying
pressure upon those whom the employer has already selected so as to
compromise their loyalty. 51
The union's second contention was that section 8(b) (1) (B) only
prohibits discipline of supervisor-members for exercising management
responsibilities, and that the performance of struck work is not a management responsibility. 52 The Seventh Circuit, however, opted for a broader
interpretation of management duties. The court reasoned that since an
employer reasonably expected such aid and since it could be vital to
preservation of the enterprise, performance of struck work is, de facto,
53
representation of the employer for the purposes of collective bargaining.
Third, the court rejected the union's attempts to bring the case within
Allis-Chalmers.54 While the court agreed that discipline of ordinary members was a significant union interest not inconsistent with section 8(b) (1)
(A), 5 it stated that when discipline of a supervisor-member is at issue,
section 8(b)(1)(B) evidenced congressional intent to protect the employer's right to undiluted loyalty from his representatives. Therefore,
Allis-Chalmers was found inapposite. 56
The Seventh Circuit also rejected the union's argument that the
company, by allowing its supervisors to retain union membership, in effect
agreed to some dilution of the loyalty of its representatives and to some
measure of discipline by the union. The court stated that if there is to
57
be such a waiver it must be in clear and unmistakeable terms.
Thus, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the Board that the purpose of
section 8(b) (1) (B) is to guarantee that the employer's representatives
51. 486 F.2d at 607, quoting San Francisco-Oakland Mailers Union No. 18, 172
N.L.R.B. 2173 (1968).
52. 486 F.2d at 605-06.
53. The Court stated:
Insofar as the supervisors work to give the employer added economic leverage,
they are acting as members of the management team are expected to act when
the employer and union are at loggerheads in their most fundamental of disputes.
Indeed, in a real sense they are representing the employer for the purpose of
collective bargaining, for "the use of economic pressure by the parties to a labor
dispute . . . is part and parcel of the process of collective bargaining."
486 F.2d at 608, quoting NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477,
495 (1960).
54. See notes 35 to 42 and accompanying text supra.
55. 486 F.2d 608-09.
56. Id. at 609. The Seventh Circuit thus applied the rule enunciated in Scofield
(see notes 47-49 and accompanying text supra) and found that the union interest
in enforcing a rule against its member's crossing a picket line was outweighed by an
overriding interest in protecting a policy which the Court believed Congress had imbedded in the labor laws.
57. by
486Villanova
F.2d at University
609-10. Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1974
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will be completely faithful to his interests. 58 The court found that the
thrust of Oakland Mailers was that when the underlying dispute is between
the employer and the union, rather than between the union and the super59
The court
visor, the union is precluded from taking disciplinary action.
found the dispute in NLRB v. Local 2150, IBEW to be primarily between
the employer and the union and the discipline thus proscribed by section
8(b) (1) (B). 6 0
In IBEW v. NLRB 61 the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit arrived at a very different conclusion on substantially similar facts.62 The court, in a five-four decision, found that the
clear purpose of section 8 (b) (1) (B) was "to prevent unions from restricting management's free choice of its agent to bargain with the union or
adjust grievances. '05 The legislative history, according to the court, showed
that congressional intent at the time of passage did not encompass prohibition of union discipline and that Congress sought only to prohibit a
union from dictating the identity of the employer's representative for
bargaining or settlement of grievances, or forcing management to bargain
through a multi-employer association.6 4 The court thus believed that this
case was outside the original parameters of section 8(b) (1) (B).
The District of Columbia Circuit recognized that the Oakland Mailers
decision had expanded the scope of section 8(b) (1) (B) beyond that
envisioned by Congress, but found that, when properly applied, its rationale
was consistent with the purposes of the section.65 The court agreed that
management's right to the uncoerced selection of its representatives for the
purposes of collective bargaining would be "hollow" if the union, through
discipline, could control the manner in which a supervisor performed man58. Id. at 604-05, citing Toledo Locals 15-P & 272 of the Lithographers & PhotoEngravers (The Toledo Blade Co.), 175 N.L.R.B. 1072, 1080, enforced, 437 F.2d
55 (6th Cir. 1971).
59. 486 F.2d at 604-05.
60. Id. But see San Francisco-Oakland Mailers Union No. 18, 172 N.L.R.B.
2173 (1968), where the Board said that in Allis-Chalmers the relationship of the union
to strikebreaking members was of primary importance to the union imposing discipline. Id. at 2174. Although Allis-Chalmers was concerned with persons within the
statutory term "employee," it is submitted that the nature of the dispute between a
strikebreaking supervisor and his union appears the same.
61. 487 F.2d 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
62. For the facts of the cases before the District of Columbia Circuit, see note
7 supra.

63. 487 F.2d at 1152.
64. Id., quoting S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1947),

quoted in I

LEGIs. HIST. 427. See also 93 Cong. Rec. 3837 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft),
quoted in II LEaIs. HIST. 1012:

This unfair labor practice referred to is not perhaps of tremendous importance, but employees cannot say to their employer, "We do not like Mr. X, we
will not meet Mr. X. You have to send us Mr. Y." . . . . [U]nder this provision
it would be impossible for a union to say to a company, "We will not bargain
with you unless you appoint your national employers' association as your agent
so that we can bargain nationally."
65. 487 F.2d at 1153. Oakland Mailers involved union discipline of a supervisormember for the manner in which he interpreted the collective bargaining agreement.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss3/6
See notes 24 & 25 and accompanying text supra.
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agement functions. 66 The court approved of the Board's language in
Oakland Mailers where it was stated that section 8(b) (1) (B) is concerned
with situations in which "'[t]he relationship between the Union and its
members ... [is] used as a convenient and, it would seem, powerful tool
..to compel the Employer's foremen to take pro-union positions in inter-

preting the collective bargaining agreement.' ,,11However, the District of
Columbia Circuit found the cases before it "critically different" from the
progeny of Oakland Mailers in that "here the union has disciplined supervisors, not for the way in which they interpreted the collective bargaining
agreement, not for being too strict with union members, but simply for
crossing a picket line to perform rank-and-file struck work. '6 8 The court
thus considered that in the instant cases the Board had gone beyond the
rationale of Oakland Mailers and beyond the scope of section 8(b) (1) (B).
The court stated that when a supervisor crosses a picket line to perform
supervisory work during a strike he remains immune from discipline but
"when a supervisor foresakes his supervisory role to do rank-and-file work
ordinarily the domain of nonsupervisory employees, he is no longer acting
as a management representative and no longer merits any immunity from
discipline." 69 The court thus rejected any attempt to bring the case within
its rationale in Meat Cutters,7 0 stating that crossing a picket line to do
struck work is not a management function protected by section 8(b) (1) (B).
According to Judge Wright, writing for the majority, the real basis
for the Board's decision was its discovery of a policy in the Act that
employers who permit supervisors to join unions are entitled to their
undivided allegiance during any dispute with the union. 71 The court saw
no basis for such a policy in the statutory language or the legislative his72
tory, and specifically rejected it.
Section 14(a) clearly permits a supervisor to retain his union membership. However, Congress also provided
that an employer could refuse to hire union members as supervisors. 73 The
court concluded that Congress had thereby effectively given the employer
66. 487 F.2d at 1154.
67. Id., quoting 172 N.L.R.B. at 2174.
68. 487 F.2d at 1155. The court also considered that the Board had overestimated the risk that discipline of this sort would affect the performance of subsequent
grievance and bargaining functions after the strike. Id.
69. Id. at 1157. A similar conclusion was reached in NLRB v. San Francisco
Typographical Union No. 21, 486 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1973). The Ninth Circuit found
that there is no reason to treat supervisors who refuse to honor the picket line any
differently than non-supervisors. Id. at 1349. The court concluded that since the
union did not punish the supervisors for exercising a management duty, the employer's
right to select management representatives under section 8(b) (1) (B) was not affected.
Id. The court found that a finding of an unfair labor practice in this type of case would
be "an unjustifiable extension of the limited language of Section 8(b) (1) (B)." Id.
at 1350.
70. See notes 27-33 and accompanying text supra.
71. 487 F.2d at 1159. The Seventh Circuit agreed with the Board that there was
such a policy.
72. Id. The District of Columbia court found that section 8(b) (1) (B) was not
intended as a comprehensive solution to the conflict of loyalties problem as it only
deals with those individuals who represent the employer for the purposes of collective
bargaining or the adjustment of grievances. Id. at 1166-67.
73. See notes 13-15 supra.
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a means of ensuring undivided loyalty through that option of whether or
not to hire union supervisors.7 4 If an employer permitted his supervisors
to join a union, he could no longer claim undivided loyalty in any employer75
union dispute.
The District of Columbia Circuit also found that the Board ruling conflicted with the contractual nature of the relationship between
member and union.78 A supervisor not subject to union discipline could
77
reap the benefits of membership without the accompanying responsibilities,
and could handicap the union's bargaining power by doing struck work.
By remaining a union member, the court reasoned, a supervisor subjected
himself to union discipline,7 8 and the employer had to accept that fact or
bargain for immunity for his supervisors in the collective bargaining
agreement.
Thus, finding section 8(b) (1) (B) to be inapplicable to the issue
presented in Electrical Workers, the court considered that the cases fall
squarely within the rationale of Allis-Chalmers.79 The court noted that in
Allis-Chalmers proper union discipline was held not to be restraint or
coercion within the meaning of section 8(b) (1) (A), and pointed out
74. 487 F.2d at 1165. Judge Leventhal, in a concurring opinion, noted that
mobility of union labor would be restricted if departure from the union meant surrender of present or prospective economic benefits. He characterized the option given

by Congress to the employer as an accommodation to employers, enabling them to
permit supervisors to remain as members of a union without surrender of economic
benefits. The tension created by having foremen owing dual loyalties "may not be
entirely felicitous so far as management is concerned, but when elected by the employer
it reflects a trade-off, making it preferable to available alternatives." Id. at 1172

(Leventhal, J., concurring). See also Gould, Some Limitations Upon Union Discipline
Under the National Labor Relations Act: The Radiations of Allis-Chalmers, 1970
DUKE L.J. 1067, wherein it is asserted:
If the employer is unduly harmed by such a rule, it seems to me that its obligation
is to make the supervisory position financially attractive enough for the supervisor
to forego the benefits of union membership and to resign.
Id. at 1129.
75. 487 F2d at 1166.
76. Id. at 1167. See generally Summers, supra note 38, at 1054. The contractual
nature of the relationship between a member and his union was most recently stressed
by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Boeing Co., 93 S. Ct. 1952 (1973).
77. The supervisor-members in the IBEW v. NLRB received such benefits as
participation in a System Council Death Benefit Fund, and eligibility for pension,
disability, and death benefits under the International's constitution. They were permitted, in the event they lost their supervisory position, to return to active membership
without paying an initiation fee. 487 F.2d at 1148. In Illinois Bell, supervisors in the
bargaining unit benefited by having the union represent them for collective bargaining
purposes. Id. at 1150. The court noted that:
Those supervisor-union members who feel that the union is not adequately
representing their interests, or who feel that they do not wish to be bound to
support the union in its economic disputes with management, are free at any
time to resign from union membership. As the Supreme Court recently made
clear, once they do so, and once they voluntarily agree to relinquish the benefits
of union membership, they are no longer subject to union discipline.
Id. at 1169. See NLRB v. Granite State Joint Bd., Textile Workers, 409 U.S. 213
(1972); Booster Lodge No. 405, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 93 S. Ct.
1961 (1973).
78. 487 F.2d at 1167; See generally NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 175 (1967) ; Summers, supra note 38, at 1054.
79. 487 F.2d at 1166-67.
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that section 8(b) (1) (B) contains the same "restrain or coerce" language. 80
The District of Columbia Circuit then tested the discipline in Electrical
Workers against the standards announced in Scofield v. NLRB,81 and
found that it did not invade or frustrate an overriding policy of the labor
laws, but was consistent with the policy, approved by the Supreme Court
in Allis-Chalmers, of permitting unions to protect against erosion of their
82
status by fining or expelling strikebreaking members.
Thus the District of Columbia Circuit found that "the Board's interpretation of the statute [could] not be derived from the statutory language
or from prior Board precedent . .. and that interpretation conflicted with

Supreme Court precedent, with the legislative history, and with basic
principles of fairness . . ." and concluded that section 8(b) (1) (B)

could

not be read to prohibit discipline of supervisor-members for performing
83
rank-and-file struck work.
The circuits sharply differed on several issues: (1) whether a supervisor is a part of management when performing rank-and-file struck work;
(2) whether and to what extent the Allis-Chalmers rationale is applicable to
section 8(b) (1) (B) problems; and (3) whether an employer who chooses
a union member as a supervisor can still claim that individual's undivided
loyalty.
There was unanimous agreement among the judges of both circuits
that "section 8(b) (1) (B) prohibits union discipline of supervisory personnel for acts performed by them in the course of their supervisory or
managerial duties."8 4 The conflict among them, of course, concerns the
content of "managerial duties." The Seventh Circuit found that management has traditionally relied upon supervisors to perform rank-and-file
work during a strike and, that in so performing, supervisors act as part
of the management team.8 5 In contrast, Judge Wright, for the District of
Columbia Circuit, found the term "management function" to have no
meaning except in contrast to the concept of rank-and-file work.80
The Seventh Circuit made the point that a supervisor's proper function
might be quite different during a strike than when a full complement of
employees is present.8 7 Performance of struck work improves an em80. Id. at 1167-68. See id. at 1159-62; notes 35-42 and accompanying text supra.
81. 394 U.S. 423 (1969). See notes 48-51 and accompanying text supra.
82. 487 F.2d at 1160. The court rejected the Board's distinction of Allis-Chalmers,
especially the argument that discipline of supervisors was an external rather than an
internal matter, noting that the internal-external distinction was not concerned with
the identities of the parties affected by union discipline, but rather with the manner
of enforcement. The court stated:
Union discipline is internal when it is enforced through fines or expulsion from
the union. It becomes "external," and a violation of Section 8(b) (1) (A) as
well as other sections of the Act, when the union seeks to have the employer fire
or take other measures against the recalcitrant union member.
Id. at 1162.
83. Id. at 1171.
84. Id. at 1174 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
85. 486 F.2d at 608.
86. 487 F.2d at 1158.
87. 486 F.2d at 608.
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ployer's bargaining position and is thus arguably part of the collective
'bargaining process. It is submitted, however, that such interests do not
appear to be those protected by Congress in section 8(b) (1) (B) .
Section 8(b) (1) (B) was aimed at union coercion of employers in
the selection of representatives, i.e., their identity. The Oakland Mailers
line of cases expanded the concept of coercion of an employer to include
how his representatives think, or act, in supervisory functions. However,
union action directed at persuading supervisors not to perform struck
work does not coerce an employer to change his representatives. It is
submitted that the only effect on the employer of supervisor refusal to
perform struck-work is that he will be forced to hire strikebreakers rather
than rely upon supervisor-members to fulfill that role. As a strikebreaker,
a supervisor does not really "represent" his employer any more than other
help which crosses a picket line. Other strikebreakers doing rank-and-file
work would not be considered part of management or come within the
statutory definition of supervisor.8 9 Therefore, it would appear that a
supervisor performing rank-and-file struck work is not performing a management function as contemplated by the Act.
The District of Columbia Circuit's analysis of the attitude a disciplined
supervisor-member would bring back to his job after a strike90 is better
reasoned than that of the Seventh Circuit. Union discipline, rather than
"driving a wedge" 91 between the employer and the supervisor may in fact
set the supervisor against his union and bring him closer in viewpoint to
his employer. 92
Thus, it would appear that since an employer is coerced neither by a
union's act of disciplining an employee who crosses a picket line, nor by
any resultant attitude, it requires an overly broad extension of section

8(b)(1)(B) and the Oakland Mailers doctrine to find an unfair labor
practice on the facts of the Electrical Workers cases.
On the question of the applicability of Allis-Chalmers, the two courts
disagreed completely. The Seventh Circuit found the decision inapposite
while the District of Columbia Circuit thought that the Electrical Workers
cases fell squarely within Allis-Chalmers. It is true that Allis-Chalmers
is superficially distinguishable since it was premised on a different sub88. See note 64 supra.
89. See NLRA § 2(11), 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1970).
90. 487 F.2d at 1156.
91. 486 F.2d at 607.
92. Illinois Bell Tel. Co. permitted the supervisors themselves to decide whether
or not to work during the strike and imposed no penalty on returning strikers. The

company promoted many of the supervisors who, under threat of union discipline,
refused to cross the picket line to perform rank-and-file struck work. 487 F.2d at 1153.
The Court stated:
The result of threatened union discipline was to turn the supervisors against the
union, not to ingratiate them into the union fold. This is even clearer when we
look at expulsion as a disciplinary measure. Those who are expelled are obviously
going to be more loyal to the company and less loyal to the union in the future.
Id. at 1156.
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section of the Act, but if the policy behind Allis-Chalmers is valid, 9it3 should
be equally applicable to "supervisors" as well as "employees."
The Allis-Chalmers Court emphasized that the legislative history of
section 8(b)(1)(A) contained nothing which evidenced that the congressional intent was to regulate traditional internal union discipline. The
94
history of section 8(b) (1) (B) is similarly devoid of any such intention.
Moreover, the Court in Allis-Chalmers recognized that unions have a sub5
That
stantial interest in disciplining persons who cross picket lines.
interest is strongly highlighted by the facts in Electrical Workers. In the
power industry, a few strikebreaking supervisor-members could virtually
destroy union bargaining strength by running a modern, automated plant.96
The District of Columbia Circuit's point that it would be unfair for supervisor-members to be able to so destroy the strength of the unions which
97
grant them benefits is well taken.
93. See Gould, supranote 74, at 1129.
94. The Supreme Court in Allis-Chalmers was of the opinion that the 1959
Landrum-Griffin amendments represented the first comprehensive congressional regulation of the conduct of internal union affairs, and concluded that "[t]he Eightysixth Congress was thus plainly of the view that union self-government was not
regulated in 1947." 388 U.S. at 194. From this conclusion, the Supreme Court, looking
to the debates on section 8(b) (1) (A) and other sections, reached its finding that
"Congress did not propose any limitations with respect to the internal affairs of
unions, aside from barring enforcement of a union's internal regulations to affect a
member's employment status." 388 U.S. at 195. This analysis also seems applicable
to section 8(b) (1) (B).
It is also significant to note that under the 1959 amendments, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 401-531 (1970), "employee" means any individual employed by an employer,
29 U.S.C. § 402(f) (1970), and "member" includes any person who has fulfilled
the requirements for membership, 29 U.S.C. § 402(o) (1970). No distinction as to
the union's ability to discipline supervisors as opposed to other union members is
made. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 411(a) (1), (2), (5), 529.
95. The Board in Oakland Mailers distinguished Allis-Chalmers in language
which would appear to distinguish the Electrical Workers cases from cases following
the Oakland Mailers rule:
The Allis-Chalmers case involved a union's fining of its members for crossing
picket lines. The primary relationship there affected was the one between the
union and its members, and the union's particular objective - solidarity in strike
action - was deemed by the Supreme Court a legitimate area for union concern
in the circumstances involved. In contrast, in the present case, the relationship
primarily affected is the one between the Union and the Employer, since the
underlying question was the interpretation of the collective bargaining agree[I]t fell outside the legitimate internal interests of the Union.
ment ....
172 N.L.RIB. at 2174. The Board thus implied that if discipline did fall within the
legitimate interests of the union it would not be proscribed by section 8(b) (1) (B).
96. The Seventh Circuit recognized the special situation in the power industry,
but took a view protective of the public, rather than the union. The court stated:
Assuredly here where the Company is an electric power company, holding
a monopoly, its management has an especial obligation to continue to provide an
indispensable public service during a time of strike.
486 F.2d at 608. This obligation would appear to run to the public at large and not
the employer - the interest protected by section 8(b) (1) (B) - and would appear
to be a moral obligation and not a legal duty.
97. A possible approach to this problem may be suggested by the Board's line
of cases dealing with union discipline of employee-members who seek the decertification of their union. It has been shown that the Supreme Court's decision in Marine
Workers proscribes union discipline which has a chilling effect on an employee's
desire to resort to the Board. See notes 43-45 and accompanying text supra. However, where the employee-member files a decertification petition with the Board a
distinction has been drawn as to whether union discipline is unlawful under section
8(b) (1) (A), based upon the penalty imposed by the union. The Board has held that
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Cast in terms of Senator Taft's view of the purpose of section
8(b) (1) (B),98 the Electrical Workers Union did not say to the employer
that it did not like his representative and would not bargain with him,
nor did it attempt to change the manner in which the representative performed management functions. The union, in effect, was saying it did not
want its members to cross the picket line and destroy its bargaining power.
The rationale of Allis-Chalmers as regards internal union rules thus would
appear applicable.
In the final area of disagreement, the Seventh Circuit believed that
Congress intended that supervisors who retained their union membership
owe their undivided loyalty to their employer. The District of Columbia
Circuit reasoned that an employer waived undivided loyalty by allowing
supervisors to remain union members. The District of Columbia Circuit's
"option" 0 theory would appear the more correct analysis of congressional
intention regarding the role of supervisors under the Act. Congress clearly
recognized that supervisor-members would inevitably be subject to some
control by the union, 100 but nevertheless permitted employers to hire union
supervisors. 101 If the employer chooses to hire only non-union supervisors,
he will retain undivided loyalty in all situations, but may well be forced
to provide additional compensation as a substitute for lost union benefits.
If, on the other hand, union supervisors are employed, union benefits
remain part of the employer's compensation package, but, in return, he
must either accept the possibility that such supervisors will refuse to
a union is prohibited from fining a member for seeking the Board's processes but
it may expel a member for taking such action. International Molders' Union, Local
125 (Blackhawk Tanning Co.), 178 N.L.R.B. 208 (1969), enforced, 422 F.2d 92
(7th Cir. 1971); Tawas Tube Products, Inc., 151 N.L.R.B. 46 (1965). The Board
relied on the proviso to section 8(b) (1) (A) (see notes 36 and 41-42 and accompanying text supra) and also reasoned that a union should be able to expel members
who attack the very existence of the union by attacking its status as bargaining
representative.
Thus, it could be found that the union has an "option." It could expel the
supervisor-member if it finds him guilty of disloyalty in the union's time of crisis, or
retain him as a member, but may not impose any other form of punishment. If the
discipline in the instant cases is held to be restraint or coercion of an employer in his
right to have management of his own choosing the above distinction could serve the
purposes of section 8(b) (1) (B) and still allow the union some measure of protection.
If a supervisor-member is fined, but remains a union member, it may serve as a
warning to him that if he does not support a union position he may lose his union
benefits. He may well be influenced by this union threat in the manner in which he
performs management functions. Thus this form of discipline might be proscribed.
If a supervisor-member is expelled he no longer has dual loyalties. See note 92 supra.
This form of discipline may be within a union's prerogative.
98. See note 64 supra.
99. See notes 73-75 and accompanying text supra. The court concluded that
"by expressly providing that foremen could unionize, and by indicating that employers
who so desired could continue to bargain collectively with supervisors, Congress
effectively gave employers an option." 487 F.2d at 1165. The House Report explained:
What the bill does is to say ... : That no one, whether employer or employee,
need have as his agent one who is obligated to those on the other side. .
H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1947), quoted in I LEGIs. HIST. at 308
(emphasis added).
100. See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-17 (1947), quoted in I LEwis
HrST. at 305-08.
101. NLRA § 14(a), 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1970).
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